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Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally
whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make
choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams
play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more
often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make
equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play
strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection
reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Strategic sophistication refers to the
extent to which players consider the structure of a game and the other players' incentives in the game before deciding on
their strategy (Crawford et al., 2013). There are many important contexts where strategic sophistication plays an important
role for organizations, such as in decisions on market entry, technology races, company takeovers, or how to optimally
intervene through monetary policy instruments in financial markets during a crisis. Examining the strategic sophistication
of teams is warranted because many economically important decisions are taken by teams rather than by individuals. One
can think of company boards, management teams, committees, or central bank boards as relevant economic agents that
make strategic decisions with far-reaching consequences.
By now, there is a large literature that examines the strategic sophistication of individuals by means of experimental
normal-form games (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Haruvy et al., 1999; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Weizsäcker, 2003;
Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Rey-Biel, 2009; Danz et al.,
2012). In a nutshell, the main insight from this literature is the fact that strategic sophistication is often limited, such thatr B.V.
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fail to best reply with their choices to their own beliefs (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008).1 By examining how teams
make strategic decisions we can contribute both to the literature on strategic sophistication and the literature on team
decision-making in the following ways.
We let teams and individuals make choices in 18 different, one-shot normal-form games that have been designed by
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) to study the strategic sophistication of individuals. In addition to asking for choices of individuals
and teams, we elicit their first order beliefs about their opponent's most likely strategy, and their second-order beliefs about
the opponent's most likely first order belief. Hence we elicit point beliefs rather than a probability distribution over all
strategies. We examine the differences between individual and team decision making by analyzing the following aspects of
strategic sophistication: (i) the relative frequency of equilibrium play and beliefs about equilibrium play, (ii) the degree of a
decision maker's consistency and the consistency expected from the opponent, where we define consistency in the sense
that choices are a best reply to stated point beliefs, (iii) the factors that make behavior more or less likely to comply with
standard textbook-rationality (by which Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, mean that a player's strategy is a payoff-maximizing
best response to the opponent's forecasted strategies, given that forecasts are correct), (iv) the distribution of eight different
strategic and non-strategic types which is estimated separately for teams and individuals by an econometric mixture model
(Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) where each decision maker's type is drawn from a common prior distribution over the eight
types and remains constant for all 18 games, and (v) the relation of choices and higher order beliefs in a model of noisy
introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004).
Our estimations on the determinants of textbook-rationality examine how the complexity of a game and how the
distribution of payoffs in equilibrium affect the likelihood of a decision maker playing Nash and expecting the opponent to
do the same. This adds to the literature on strategic sophistication by shedding more light on which factors of a game
promote or hinder equilibrium choices and beliefs. Rey-Biel (2009) has investigated the influence of constant-sum games vs.
variable-sum games on the predictive power of Nash equilibrium, finding that the likelihood of observing Nash equilibrium
choices is higher in constant-sum games than variable-sum games. We contribute to this issue by focusing on the role of the
decision maker (being either an individual or a team).
We also contribute to the flourishing research on team decision making. While the basic bottom-line of team decision
making-research seems to be that teams are “more rational” than individuals in strategic games – meaning that team
behavior is in the aggregate typically closer to standard game theoretic predictions than individual behavior (see, e.g.,
Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Bornstein et al., 2004; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Charness and Jackson,
2007)2 – we are not aware of any research on team decision making that classifies single teams as of a particular strategic or
non-strategic type and compares the distribution of different types across individuals and teams. We analyze the strategic
sophistication of teams by considering not only choices, but also their first- and second-order point beliefs. Eliciting beliefs
allows us to check whether teams are more likely to best reply to their own first-order beliefs, and whether teams expect
their opponents to be best responding as well (by matching first-order beliefs with second-order beliefs). Furthermore, we
estimate a model of noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004) where a player's choice probabilities are given by a logit
best response that is a function of the player's first order beliefs, and where beliefs are again a function of one level higher
order beliefs.3 None of this has been studied in the team decision-making literature before.4 Our paper can therefore provide
a fine-grained picture of the (bounded) rationality and strategic sophistication of teams and how this compares to individual
decision making.
Based on a total of 192 experimental participants, we find that teams play Nash-strategies in about 50% of cases, while
individuals do it significantly less often in only about 40% of cases. The choices of teams are also significantly more often a
best response to their own first order point beliefs. We denote such behavior as consistent, and teams are more often
consistent than individuals. Moreover, teams expect their opponents to be more often consistent, i.e., first-order point
beliefs are more often a best reply to second-order point beliefs. In the noisy introspection model we find that teams differ
significantly from individuals in the estimated higher order beliefs (of order two and higher), indicating that the differences
between individuals and teams are largely driven by differences in beliefs, although there is also a difference in the
likelihood of best responding to beliefs.
Addressing the determinants of textbook-rationality (of playing and expecting equilibrium strategies) we note that the
complexity of a game and the distributions of payoffs in equilibrium have an important impact. A game's complexity is
interpreted as the required number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance a row or column player needs to identify1 Strategic reasoning is not only limited in normal-form games, but also in a wider variety of games, such as auctions (Gneezy, 2005) or information
cascades (Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004).
2 The paper by Cason and Mui (1997) is often misinterpreted as showing that teams are more generous than individuals in a dictator game. However,
Cason and Mui (1997) did not find that teams in general are more generous than individuals, but only reported more other-regarding team choices when
team members differed in their individual dictator game choices.
3 As in Goeree and Holt (2004), the error rates follow a geometrical progression that is specified using two parameters: the error rate of actions and a
“telescoping” parameter that determines how fast error rates are increasing for higher order beliefs. Using the estimates of these parameters we compute
the error rates for beliefs with the standard errors computed using the delta method.
4 Second-order beliefs in normal-form games have been studied with individuals as decision makers by Bhatt and Camerer (2005) and in the working
paper version of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008). The role of second-order beliefs on actual behavior (of individuals) in extensive form games (such as
a lost wallet-game or a trust game) is studied in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) or Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), for instance.
M. Sutter et al. / European Economic Review 64 (2013) 395–410 397the own equilibrium choice. Teams and individuals differ in their behavior in particular when the game has an intermediate
complexity (of requiring two rounds of iteration). If payoffs are more unequal in equilibrium, equilibrium play and beliefs
get less likely, suggesting that players are somewhat inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).Fig. 1. The 18 normal-form games.
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making is a strategic D1-type that applies one step of deleting strategies that are dominated by pure strategies and then
plays best reply to a uniform prior over the opponent's remaining strategies. Individuals are classified as strategic
significantly less often, i.e., in only 40% of cases. Their modal type is a non-strategic optimistic type (which chooses the
strategy that maximizes the maximum possible payoff, thus implicitly assuming that the opponent plays randomly).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the experimental design. Section 3 reports the
results. Section 4 discusses our results and concludes the paper.
2. Experimental design
2.1. The 18 normal-form games
Fig. 1 presents the 18 normal-form games that we used in our experiment. They are taken from Costa-Gomes et al.
(2001), because these games are very well designed to study strategic thinking and behavior. Out of the 18 games, 16 games
are pairs of isomorphic games (which are identical for row and column players except for transformation of player roles and
small, uniform payoff shifts). We applied the same order of games as in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). This is indicated in Fig. 1
as “game # x”, with x∈{1, …, 18}. In brackets after the game number we refer to two different types of games. “D”-games
(“ND”-games) are those in which one (none) of the two players has a strictly dominant strategy. In total, there are 10
D-games and eight ND-games. Note that in all games the unique, pure strategy Nash equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by
another strategy combination of row and column players, which creates a tension between equilibrium play and efficiency
concerns.
The number of rows (columns) indicates the number of available strategies for row (column) players. The 18 games have
different levels of complexity, interpreted as the required number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance a row or
column player needs to identify the own equilibrium choice. The notation [xR, yR] refers to the number of rounds needed for the
row (x) and column player (y) to identify the equilibrium. In D-games, we have x, y∈{1, 2}, while in ND-games x, y∈{2, 3, 1},
where [1R, 1R] denotes non-dominance solvable games.
2.2. Treatments, decisions and payments
We have implemented three different treatments which are distinguished by which types of decision makers are
interacting with each other in the normal-form games. Note that the treatment – and thus the type of decision maker in the
opponent's role – was common knowledge in the experiment (see the experimental instructions in Supplementary
material). Ind: In the individual treatment both row and column players were individuals.
 Team: In the team treatment both row and column players were teams of three subjects each. Team members sat
together in a sound-proof cabin and could communicate with each other in order to reach a team-decision. There were
no restrictions on communication and no regulations how a team should reach an agreement, except that only one
decision could be entered by a team on the computer. Mixed: In the mixed treatment a team of three subjects was interacting with an individual. In half of the Mixed-sessions
the team was in the role of the row-player and the individual in the role of the column-player, while the reverse order
applied in the other half of sessions.
The Mixed treatment has been included because it allows examining whether individuals and teams condition their
choices and beliefs on the type of decision maker (individual or team) in the opponent's role. To avoid any influence of the
kind of presentation on the data, we presented all games to all players in a way that they saw themselves as a row player.
In each single game each player (either individual or team) had to make three different decisions: Choice: This was a player's choice of a row in a given game.
 First-order belief (FOB): Each player had to indicate the action expected from the opponent.
 Second-order belief (SOB): Players stated a belief about their opponent's first-order belief.Each player had to make all three decisions in each of the 18 games, yielding a total of 54 decisions to be taken during the
experiment. We proceeded game by game with all three decisions, but the order of the three decisions for a given game was
randomly determined.5 In order to suppress learning, partners changed after each game (random matching) and there was
no feedback until the experiment was finished. All details of this procedure were common knowledge to participants.
In order to keep the per-capita incentives constant for individuals and teams the payoffs described in the following were
paid to each member of a team, and participants knew this. At the end of the experiment each player needed to draw a card5 Note that Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) do not find order effects depending on whether to elicit beliefs before choices or the other way round.
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payment. Players then received full information about their own and their opponent's choices and beliefs in this game.
Afterwards, players were asked to draw another card from a deck of cards showing numbers 1 (for choice), 2 (for first-order
belief), or 3 (for second-order belief). If a player was paid for her choice, the player received 30 Euro Cents for each
experimental point earned in the game as a consequence from the own and the opponent's choice (as shown in Fig. 1).
Players who were paid for their first-order or second-order belief received 15 Euros if their belief was correct, but nothing if
it was wrong. The all-or-nothing feature for paying beliefs was intended to make the decisions on first- and second-order
beliefs as salient as possible.6
Eliciting point beliefs – instead of a probability distribution of beliefs over different actions – may be criticized because it
may make it difficult to check the consistency of actions and beliefs. While eliciting a probability distribution of beliefs over
actions may look like a remedy to this problem, asking for a probability distribution requires full understanding of
participants and auxiliary assumptions that subjects maximize expected payoffs. It has also potential problems with
checking consistency when first- and second-order beliefs (one of our central design-features) are involved. It is possible
that a subject's first-order belief (in the form of a probability distribution) fails to be a best response to his second-order
belief (also in the form of a probability distribution), although both beliefs are optimally stated.7 For these reasons, and in
order to keep the experiment simple, we have opted for asking for point beliefs.2.3. Experimental procedure
In each treatment we conducted four sessions that were run in the video-lab of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in
Jena. This lab has eight sound-proof cabins which are connected via a computer network (using z-Tree by Fischbacher,
2007). The cabins provide teams with an opportunity to talk to each other without other teams hearing what they say.
We ran also the sessions with individuals as decision makers in the video-lab in order to keep the conditions of individual
and team decision making as identical as possible. Participants were never videotaped, and they were told so at the
beginning of the experiment. This design choice was motivated to minimize the possibility that potential differences
between individuals and teams might have been driven by the fact that team discussions were taped.
In each session we had eight decision makers. Four of them were row players and four column players. Depending upon
the treatment, a decision maker was either an individual subject or a team of three subjects. When recruiting subjects with
the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), assignment to treatments was randomly determined. In the treatments with team
decision making, subjects were randomly assigned to a particular team at the beginning of the experiment. Teams stayed
together for the entire experiment. The matching of row and column players was random and changed after each game.
Note that for a particular game (with its three decisions) the matching was kept constant. To make sure that participants
understood the instructions and the experimental tasks, they needed to answer a questionnaire before the experiment in
which they were tested how choices and first- and second-order beliefs mapped into outcomes and payoffs. These questions
had to be answered individually, and all participants gave correct answers.
In sum, we had a total of 192 participants, recruited from the undergraduate student population of the University of Jena.
For each game in each treatment we obtained 32 different observations. No subject was allowed to participate in more than
one session. On average, a session lasted 2 h and subjects earned 16.5 Euro, including a show-up fee of four Euro.3. Experimental results
In the first Section 3.1 we analyze whether the players' decisions are dependent on their roles as row and column players
and whether playing against the same type of decision maker (individual or team) or against the other type makes a
difference. This section is followed by an examination of strategies and point beliefs (Section 3.2). The corresponding
analysis mainly focuses on the influence of a decision's complexity. Based on our chosen definition of consistency, Section
3.3 analyzes consistency in the general sense that a consistent decision is a best reply to a certain point belief. Section 3.4
focuses on the frequency of playing and expecting the Nash equilibrium to be played by the opponent. The result-section
concludes with two econometric estimations. One allows us to test for the likelihood of nine different decision maker types
(Section 3.5), the other one to explore whether behavioral differences are driven by differences in rationality or beliefs
(Section 3.6).6 Since subjects were either paid for their choice or for one of their beliefs, the issue of hedging choices and beliefs (see Blanco et al., 2010) is of no
concern in our case.
7 We would like to thank Georg Weizsäcker for drawing our attention to the problems of inconsistency between first- and second-order beliefs even
for situations in which probability distributions are elicited. To illustrate the main intuition, consider the two following cases: (i) Subject A expects subject
B to have two different first-order beliefs such that with a 50% probability subject B expects subject A to play his first strategy for sure and with a 50%
probability he expects subject A to play his second strategy for sure. (ii) Subject A expects subject B to think that subject A plays any of his first two
strategies by 50%. In both cases an optimally reported second order belief assigns a 50% probability to both strategies. Depending on situation (i) or (ii)
prevailing, it is possible that subject B's best reply differs between (i) and (ii). As a consequence, subject A's first-order belief can differ, and if case (i) is the
true second-order belief, it is possible that the optimal first-order belief for subject A is not a best reply to the optimal second-order belief (if we implicitly
assume case (ii)).
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In the following analysis we pool the data of row and column players, because 16 out of 18 games are isomorphic games
which are practically identical for row and column players expect for small payoff shifts and the transformation of player
roles (see Costa-Gomes et al., 2001, for details). All analyses presented below are based on all 18 games.8
We have also examined whether players’ choices and beliefs depend on the opponent's type being a team or an
individual. In other words, we tested whether the distribution of choices and first- and second-order beliefs differs for
individuals between treatments Ind and Mixed, respectively for teams between treatments Team and Mixed. In a total of 216
tests, we find four significant differences (at the 5%-level) for individuals (between individual behavior in Ind andMixed) and
five significant differences (at the 5%-level) for teams (between team behavior in Team and Mixed). Hence, the statistical
tests (see Table S0 in Supplementary material) yield rejection rates that are within the limits of chance. From this we
conclude that decision makers do not condition their behavior and their beliefs on the type of decision maker in the
opponent role (see also the discussion of Table 4 in Section 3.4). This is most likely due to giving no feedback until the end of
the experiment, which prevents teams or individuals to learn about the decision patterns of their opponents and thus
calibrate their decisions on the experienced decision patterns of their opponents. We summarize as our first result:
Result 1: Neither individuals nor teams condition their choices and point beliefs on the type of decision maker (individual
or team) in the opponent role.
This result allows us to pool individual decisions in treatments Ind and Mixed, as well as team decisions in Team and
Mixed. Hence, when we talk of individual (team) decisions in the following, we refer to all decisions made by individuals
(teams) in the different treatments. Due to the circumstance that we had 16 individuals and 16 teams as decision makers in
Mixed, we obtain 48 observations for individuals, and 48 for teams, after pooling the data.3.2. Choices, first- and second-order beliefs of individuals and teams
In Table 1 we report the relative frequency of different strategies – chosen either by teams or individuals – across all
games, and separately for D-games and ND-games.9 We distinguish between the strategy that leads to the Nash-equilibrium
(“Nash”), the strategy that could yield an outcome that Pareto-dominates the Nash-equilibrium (“Pareto”), and other
strategies (“Other”). The upper panel reports relative frequencies for own choices, the middle and lower panel for first-order,
respectively second-order, beliefs.
We compare the relative frequencies of the different strategies chosen by individuals and teams by considering for each
single decision maker the relative frequency of choosing a particular strategy across all games (or across D- and ND-games
separately) and then apply a two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test to the resulting data. We see from the upper panel of Table 1
that teams are significantly more often playing the Nash-strategy than individuals (49.30% vs. 40.97%; po0.05).10
Individuals choose more often what we call the “Pareto”-strategy of trying to improve on the Nash-equilibrium choice
(53.47% vs. 45.72%; po0.05). These differences between individuals and teams are mainly driven by the 10 games with a
dominant strategy. Only in D-games teams are significantly more often playing Nash, and less often playing Pareto, while
there is no significant difference between individuals and teams in the ND-games where neither player has a dominant
strategy. This indicates that the presence or absence of a dominant strategy for one of the players has an impact on how the
type of decision maker influences behavior.
The middle panel in Table 1 considers first-order beliefs. Although teams expect their opponents to play Nash more
often, respectively Pareto less often, than individuals, none of these differences is significant according to conventional
levels. As seen in the lower panel, however, individuals and teams differ in their second order beliefs in the set of D-games.
Similar to the choice data, teams think that their opponents expect them to play Nash more often, respectively Pareto less
often, than individual decision makers.11
Comparing across panels in Table 1, while holding the type of decision maker constant, we find that the relative
frequency of playing Nash decreases from top to bottom, i.e., it is highest for own choices, intermediate for first-order beliefs
and lowest for second-order beliefs. This holds true both for individuals and teams and the descending order is significant8 If we excluded the two non-isomorphic games, all results would remain qualitatively the same.
9 Tables S1–S6 in Supplementary material present the relative frequencies of each single strategy in each single game, both for individuals and teams,
and for choices, first- and second-order beliefs.
10 If players chose their strategies randomly, then the expected relative frequency of observing Nash equilibrium choices would be 43%. In Fig. F1 of
Supplementary material we show that players’ choices of both individuals and teams are significantly different from random, though. In this Fig. F1 we plot
the relative frequency of playing Nash in x out of 18 games (with x∈{1, 18}) and compare the distributions of actually observed relative frequencies and
theoretically expected ones in case of random play. The upper panel of Fig. F1 plots choices, first- and second-order beliefs for individuals, and the lower
panel for teams. In all six cases we find that the actually observed distribution is significantly different from a random one (Kolmogorov–Smirnov one
sample test, po0.05 in all cases).
11 In Supplementary material we provide in Tables S7–S10 the relative frequency with which individuals and teams were correct in their first- and
second-order beliefs. On average, teams were slightly more often correct in their beliefs (62.7% vs. 61.0% for first-order beliefs; 69.1% vs. 68.6% for second-
order beliefs), but the different accuracy of beliefs is far from being significant.
Table 1
Choices and beliefs of individuals and teams (relative frequencies in %).
All games D-games ND-games
Choice Nash Individuals 40.97nn 57.71nn 20.05
Teams 49.30 70.42 22.92
Pareto Individuals 53.47nn 41.25nn 68.75
Teams 45.72 28.96 66.67
Other Individuals 5.56 1.04 11.20
Teams 4.98 0.62 10.41
First-order beliefs Nash Individuals 37.26 55.63 14.32
Teams 40.04 60.62 14.32
Pareto Individuals 57.06 43.33 74.22
Teams 55.21 38.75 75.78
Other Individuals 5.68 1.04 11.46
Teams 4.75 0.63 9.90
Second-order beliefs Nash Individuals 30.55 47.71nn 9.11
Teams 33.79 53.96 8.59
Pareto Individuals 62.62 50.21n 78.13
Teams 61.11 45.42 80.73
Other Individuals 6.83 2.08n 12.76
Teams 5.10 0.62 10.68
n Significant difference between individuals (in a given row) and teams (in the next row) at p o 0.1; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
nn Significant difference between individuals and teams at po0.05; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
M. Sutter et al. / European Economic Review 64 (2013) 395–410 401for both types of decision makers (po0.05; Page tests). Hence, equilibrium play is less likely according to beliefs than
according to own choices and less likely the higher the order of beliefs.12
In Table 2 we examine the influence of a game's complexity on choices and beliefs. For both D- and ND-games we report
the relative frequencies of chosen strategies, contingent on the number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance a
player needs to identify the own equilibrium choice. The first column shows that in games with a dominant strategy those
players with the dominant strategy play Nash in about 80% of cases. There is no significant difference between individuals
and teams, neither for choices nor for first- or second-order beliefs.
However, the second column reveals a very strong difference between individuals and teams when they are in the role of
the player without the dominant strategy (when the opponent has one). While teams choose the Nash-strategy in almost
60% of cases then, individuals play Nash in less than 40%. The reverse holds true for the Pareto strategy. The differences in
choices between individuals and teams (when they need two rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance to identify the
own equilibrium choice) is mirrored in second-order beliefs. Teams also think that their opponents expect them to play
Nash almost double as often as individuals think of their opponents (25.42% vs. 13.75%). The differences in first-order beliefs
are qualitatively similar, but fail significance at conventional levels.
The third column in Table 2 considers games without a dominant strategy for either of the players, and it clearly confirms
the findings from the second column. When two rounds of iterated dominance are needed, teams play significantly more
often Nash – and less often Pareto – than individuals. The same pattern is found for first- and second-order beliefs (with the
differences being weakly significant for first-order beliefs). The final two columns in Table 2 show that for more complex
games (with more than two rounds of iterated dominance) there are no significant differences in strategy choices between
individuals and teams. Thus, the evidence from Table 2 suggests that for very straightforward decisions (when a player has a
dominant strategy) and for more complex decisions (with more than two rounds of iterated dominance) there are no
differences between individuals and teams. Yet, for decisions with two rounds of iterated dominance teams choose (and
think that they are expected to choose) more often the equilibrium-strategy.13
Result 2: Overall, teams play the equilibrium strategy significantly more often than individuals. Taking a game's
complexity into account we find that individuals and teams do not differ in the likelihood of playing equilibrium when they
have a dominant strategy or need more than two steps of iterated dominance. In situations where two steps are required,
though, teams play equilibrium much more often. These differences in choice-patterns of individuals and teams are also
reflected in their point beliefs, in particular in second-order point beliefs.12 This pattern is consistent with a model of noisy introspection by Goeree and Holt (2004) in which they predict more noise (and less equilibrium
play) the higher the order of beliefs. Section 3.6 gets back to this point.
13 The pattern observed in Table 2 is reflected from a different perspective in Table S11 in Supplementary material. It reports the relative frequency
of equilibrium play in the different types of games, classified by the available number of strategies for row and column players and the presence or absence
of a dominant strategy for a player or its opponent. Table S11 also reveals significant differences between individuals and teams in the games where the
opponent has a dominant strategy.
Table 2
Complexity of the game, choices and beliefs (relative frequencies in %).
Complexity
(game type)a 1R (D) 2R (D) 2R (ND) 3R (ND) 1R (ND)
Choice Nash Individuals 76.67 38.75nn 31.25n 14.58 17.19
Teams 81.67 59.17 44.79 10.42 18.23
Pareto Individuals 22.50 60.00nn 68.75n 56.25 75.00
Teams 17.91 40.00 55.21 57.29 77.08
Other Individuals 0.83 1.25 0.00 29.17 7.81
Teams 0.42 0.83 0.00 32.29 4.69
First-order beliefs Nash Individuals 88.75 22.50 21.87n 7.29 14.06
Teams 87.92 33.33 33.33 6.25 8.86
Pareto Individuals 10.42 76.25 78.13n 56.25 81.25n
Teams 10.83 66.67 66.67 57.29 89.58
Other Individuals 0.83n 1.25n 0.00 36.46 4.69
Teams 1.25 0.00 0.00 36.46 1.56
Second-order beliefs Nash Individuals 81.67 13.75nn 9.37 9.37 8.85
Teams 82.50 25.42 17.71 4.17 6.25
Pareto Individuals 16.25 84.17nn 90.63 50.00 85.94
Teams 17.08 73.75 82.29 57.29 91.67
Other Individuals 2.08n 2.08n 0.00 40.63 5.21
Teams 0.42n 0.83 0.00 38.54 2.08
nSignificant difference between individuals (in a given row) and teams (in the next row) at p o 0.1; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
nnSignificant difference between individuals and teams at po0.05; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
a The columns separate behavior according to (i) the different number of rounds (R) of iterated pure-strategy dominance a player needs to identify the
own equilibrium choice, and (ii) the presence (D) or absence (ND) of a dominant strategy in the game.
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Our design allows us to check not only the consistency of choices and beliefs but also the opponents’ expected
consistency. We denote a player's choice as consistent with beliefs if the choice is a best reply to the player's own first-
order point belief. Likewise, we define the opponent's expected consistency as to whether the first-order point belief is
a best reply to a player's second-order point belief. The latter determines basically a player's first-order belief about the
opponent's consistency. Moreover we can distinguish the two most frequent types of consistency. One type is a
straightforward combination of playing Nash and expecting the opponent to play Nash as well. We call this the “Nash-
consistency” (Nash-CON). The other type is when the combination of a player's choice and first-order belief would yield
the maximal payoff that is available for the player in a specific game. We call this the “Maximax-consistency” (Max-
CON). Note that Max-CON cannot coincide with the Nash-equilibrium in our games. The relative frequency of these two
consistency types can be examined not only for a player himself, but also for the player's expectation about the
opponent's consistency type.
Table 3 reports in the upper part the relative frequency of average own consistency and in the lower part the average
expected consistency of the opponent player.14 Moreover, in each part of the table the relative frequency of Nash-CON and
Max-CON is reported. We find that only about one half of the individual decisions (55.79%) are a best-reply to the
individual's own first-order (point) belief, confirming the earlier findings by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) or Danz
et al. (2012).15 However, we find that teams play best-reply significantly more often (65.63%; po0.05, two-sided Mann–
Whitney U-test). We see from the column “D-games” that this difference is predominantly driven by the games where one
party has a dominant strategy. The lower part of Table 3 indicates that teams also expect their opponents to be more often
consistent by playing best reply. Due to the circumstance that point beliefs, which are the basis for our consistency-check,
might actually be based on probability distributions over different actions, a lack of consistency described in this subsection
does not necessarily imply irrationality. In Section 3.6 we estimate a model of noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004) in
order to explore whether the differences between individuals and teams are driven by differences in rationality or beliefs.
Next, we examine the consistency of choices and beliefs in more detail by having a look at the two types of consistency
described above. For the player's own consistency we find a very strong difference between individuals and teams with14 In Fig. F2 of Supplementary material we plot the theoretically expected relative frequency of being consistent in x out of 18 games under the
assumption of random play (with x∈{1, 18}) versus the actually observed relative frequency of being consistent. We note a clear rightward shift – in
particular for teams – of the actually observed distribution, clearly rejecting the null-hypothesis of randomness in consistency (po0.01 for individuals and
teams, both for own consistency and the opponent's expected consistency; Kolmogorov–Smirnov one-sample tests).
15 Danz et al. (2012) show that the relative frequency of best responses to own beliefs increases with repetition if feedback is given after each game.
However, in their study it also starts out with slightly more than 50% in the first of twenty rounds – which is comparable to the level we observe without
feedback – and it converges to only around 75% in the final round of their experiment.
Table 3
Consistency of decisions (relative frequency of best reply in % of total choices).
All games D-games ND-games
Player's own consistency of which: Individuals 55.79nn 60.00nnn 50.52
Teams 65.63 75.21 53.65
Nash-CON Individuals 18.75nn 27.71nnn 7.55
Teams 27.66 45.00 5.99
Max-CON Individuals 32.52 31.67 33.59
Teams 31.37 29.58 33.59
Expected consistency of the opponen of which Individuals 59.38 62.29 55.73
Teams 63.08 68.54 56.25
Nash – CON Individuals 10.65nn 15.63nn 4.43
Teams 17.25 28.75 2.86
Max-CON Individuals 44.56 44.79nn 44.27
Teams 41.09 37.71 43.49
nn Significant difference between individuals and teams at p o 0.05; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
nnn Significant difference between individuals and teams at p o 0.01; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
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can be classified as Nash-CON, it is 45% of team choices and beliefs in the 10 D-games where one player has a dominant
strategy (po0.01, two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test). Moreover we note that while in ND-games more than 60% of the
consistent choices of teams and individuals coincide with Max-CON definition, in the D-games teams and individuals
display a very different distribution across consistency types: more than 60% of consistent choices of teams coincide with
Nash-CON while less than 50% of consistent choices of individuals coincide with Nash-CON. From the lower part of Table 3
we also note that teams expect their opponents significantly more often to be of the Nash-CON-type than individuals, while
individuals expect opponents more often to be of the Max-CON-type.16
Result 3: Teams make more often consistent choices than individuals, such that the choices of a team are more frequently
a best reply to their first-order point beliefs about the opponent's behavior. Also, teams play the Nash-strategy and expect it
from the opponent much more often than individuals do. Individuals’ choices and point beliefs more often focus
(optimistically) on the maximum available payoff.
3.4. The determinants of textbook rationality
As a final step in analyzing the consistency of decisions we examine the determinants that increase the likelihood of
“Nash-consistency”. Note that this is precisely the type of consistency standard game theory would predict for rational and
payoff-maximizing decision makers (i.e., playing Nash and expecting the opponent to do the same). Hence, estimating the
factors that make “Nash-consistency” more likely does not only reveal which factors promote this type of consistency, but
also which ones prevent decision makers from playing the equilibrium strategy and expecting their opponent to do the
same. In Table 4 we report a probit estimation of a player's Nash-CON on various factors that are explained in the following.
Since each decision maker had to make decisions in 18 different games, we cluster the standard errors on the
decision maker.
Panel [A] of Table 4 shows that the consistency type Nash-CON is more likely if players have a dominant strategy
themselves (“dominant strategy”) or if their opponent has one (“opponent dominant strategy”). The next three independent
variables are all insignificant. Making decisions in a team (“team player”), having a team as opponent player (“oppo-
nent¼team”) or playing as a team against another team (“team n opponent¼team”) does not influence the likelihood of
“Nash-consistency”. The latter two terms confirm that the type of decision maker in the opponent role does not matter for
decision making. However, the interaction terms of team decision making with dominant strategy for oneself (“team n
dominant strategy”) or for the opponent (“team n opponent dominant strategy”) have a significantly positive effect each.
This is in line with our previous findings that decisions in the D-games mainly drive the differences between individuals
and teams.
The final four variables in panel [A] of Table 4 consider the magnitude and distribution of payoffs in a game in different
ways. The variable “risk with maxstrategy” measures the absolute difference between the decision maker's payoff in the
Nash-equilibrium and the decision maker's payoff in case he chose the strategy in which the game's highest payoff is
possible while the opponent played Nash. In other words, this variable indicates how much money is at risk when a decision
maker tries (unsuccessfully) to reach his maximal possible payoff instead of playing Nash. The estimation shows that Nash-
CON gets weakly significantly more likely the more money is at risk if a player wants to deviate to the strategy that could16 In Fig. F3 of Supplementary material we compare the relative frequency of Nash-consistency if players’ choices were random to the actually
observed relative frequencies. Again, the actually observed distributions are significantly different from random both for individuals and teams as well as
for the own Nash-consistency and the opponent's expected Nash-consistency (po0.01; Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests).
Table 4
Determinants of a player's consistency-type Nash-CON.
Variable Coefficient Standard error
[A] Probit regression
dominant strategy 1.313 0.281nn
opponent dominant strategy 0.935 0.257nn
team player 0.145 0.287
opponent¼team 0.053 0.242
team n opponent¼team 0.053 0.329
team n dominant strategy 0.508 0.209nn
team n opponent dominant strategy 0.703 0.221nn
risk with maxstrategy 0.011 0.007n
risk with maxstrategy opponent 0.000 0.007
advantageous inequality in Nash 0.013 0.012
disadvantageous inequality in Nash 0.038 0.013nn
Constant 1.339 0.405nn
[B] Marginal effects of team decision making contingent on binary independent variables
Dominant strategy Opponent dominant strategy Opponent¼Team Marginal effect Standard error
Yes No Yes 0.163 0.100
Yes No No 0.143 0.102
No Yes Yes 0.221 0.089nn
No Yes No 0.204 0.090nn
No No Yes 0.009 0.025
No No No 0.014 0.029
N¼1.728; standard errors clustered for the 96 decision makers (48 individuals, 48 teams).
Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of independent variables (risk with maxstrategy, risk with maxstrategy opponent, advantageous inequality in Nash,
disadvantageous inequality in Nash) and contingent on the three binary variables indicated in the top row (and their interaction effect with team decision
making).
n Coefficient significant at po0.1.
nn Coefficient significant at po0.05.
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measures the opponent's potential losses from deviating from Nash. This variable has no significant influence on a player's
likelihood to be Nash-consistent.
Since subjects have been shown to respond in an asymmetric way to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999), we consider two separate variables to measure payoff inequalities in the Nash equilibrium:
“advantageous inequality in Nash” (defined as max {own payoff – opponent's payoff in Nash, 0}) and “disadvantageous
inequality in Nash” (defined as max {opponent's payoff – own payoff in Nash, 0}). Table 4 shows that advantageous
inequality does not influence a player's likelihood to be Nash-CON. However, if disadvantageous inequality increases in the
Nash equilibrium, a player is less likely of the Nash-CON-type. Hence, distributional preferences such as inequality aversion
have a significant influence on consistent behavior in our experiment. It is important to note that interacting any of the final
four variables in Table 4 with the variable “team player” does not yield any significant effects. Hence, payoff distributions
affect the Nash-consistency of individuals and teams to the same extent.
Panel [B] of Table 4 reports the marginal effects of team decision making (compared to individual decision making) for
specific combinations of the binary variables from panel [A], evaluated at the means of the four ultimate variables in panel
[A]. If a decision maker has no dominant strategy, while the opponent has one, the likelihood of observing Nash-consistency
is more than 20 percentage points higher when teams instead of individuals make choices and state their first-order beliefs.
If a decision maker has a dominant strategy, while the opponent does not, then teams are also more likely to be Nash-
consistent, however, the effect fails significance.
Table 5 reports a similar probit regression as Table 4, but takes as the dependent variable a player's expectation about the
opponent being a Nash-CON-type. The variables used in Table 5 are defined from the point of view of the player who states
first- and second-order beliefs. Basically, we find very similar results as in Table 4, with a few noteworthy exceptions. Most
strikingly, “opponent dominant strategy” is not significant in itself, while “teams n opponent dominant strategy” is
significantly positive. Taken together, this shows that individuals fail to recognize that if an opponent has a dominant
strategy then the opponent is more likely to be Nash-consistent (as it has become clear from Table 4). On the contrary, teams
expect (correctly) opponents who have a dominant strategy to be more often Nash-consistent. These implications are fully
in line with our previous findings on the differences between individuals and teams when the degree of complexity is
intermediate (i.e., requiring two steps of reasoning). The variable “advantageous inequality in Nash” is significantly negative
in Table 5, indicating that players expect their opponents to be less often consistent even when the Nash-equilibrium would17 The estimation presented in Table 4 remains qualitatively identical if we used the relative – rather than the absolute – losses from deviating from the
Nash strategy. In fact, “risk with maxstrategy” becomes significant even at the 5%-level, while all other significant variables in Table 4 keep their
significance level with the alternative specification. We have opted for absolute losses since this fits better to the final two independent variables.
Table 5
Determinants of the opponent's expected consistency-type being Nash-CON.
Variable Coefficient Standard error
[A] Probit regression
dominant strategy 1.594 0.369nn
opponent dominant strategy 0.414 0.289
team player 0.196 0.364
opponent ¼team 0.023 0.256
team n opponent¼team 0.045 0.340
team n dominant strategy 0.581 0.269nn
team n opponent dominant strategy 0.720 0.229nn
risk with maxstrategy 0.020 0.007nn
risk with maxstrategy opponent 0.007 0.006
advantageous inequality in Nash 0.036 0.013nn
disadvantageous inequality in Nash 0.037 0.014nn
Constant 1.465 0.417nn
[B] Marginal effects of team decision making contingent on binary independent variables
Dominant strategy Opponent dominant strategy Opponent¼Team Marginal effect Standard error
Yes No Yes 0.108 0.048nn
Yes No No 0.099 0.052n
No Yes Yes 0.169 0.095n
No Yes No 0.151 0.107
No No Yes 0.008 0.015
No No No 0.011 0.022
N¼1.728; standard errors clustered for the 96 decision makers (48 individuals, 48 teams).
Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of independent variables (risk with maxstrategy, risk with maxstrategy opponent, advantageous inequality in Nash,
disadvantageous inequality in Nash) and contingent on the three binary variables indicated in the top row (and their interaction effect with team decision
making).
n Coefficient significant at po0.1.
nn Coefficient significant at po0.05.
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consistency is concerned (see Table 4). Panel [B] of Table 5 reports the marginal effects of team decision making (compared
to individual decision making) on the likelihood of expecting the opponent to be Nash-consistent. The results are very
similar to those discussed above for Table 4 and hence we dispense with a detailed discussion.
Result 4: Teams are more likely than individuals to be a Nash-consistency type – and expect their opponents to be of this
type also more often – when the game has a dominant strategy. Inequality in payoffs in the Nash equilibrium makes
consistent decisions (of choices and first-order beliefs, respectively of first- and second-order beliefs) less likely. Hence,
distributional preferences affect the degree of standard game-theoretic rationality.3.5. Econometric estimation I: strategic and non-strategic types
Next, we present a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of players’ choices following the econometric model used in
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). This econometric model is a mixture model in which each player's type is drawn from a common
prior distribution over eight types and remains constant for all 18 games. The nine types that we consider can be classified
into non-strategic and strategic types and are defined as in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001),18 :
Non-strategic types: (1) An altruistic type tries to maximize the sum of payoffs to himself and the opponent, implicitly
assuming that the opponent is also altruistic.19 (2) A pessimistic type chooses the strategy that secures the best of all worst
outcomes. Hence, a pessimistic type plays maximin. (3) An optimistic type chooses the strategy that maximizes the
maximum possible payoff, thus ignoring the incentives of the opponent player. (4) A naïve type best responds to beliefs that
assign equal probabilities to its partner's decisions.20
Strategic types: (5) Type L2 plays best response to optimistic (naïve) types. (6) Type D1 applies one step of deleting
strategies that are dominated by pure strategies and then plays best reply to a uniform prior over the opponent's remaining
strategies. (7) Type D2 applies two steps of deleting dominated strategies and then best responds to a uniform prior over the
opponent's remaining strategies. (8) An equilibrium type makes equilibrium choices (which are unique in our games). (9) A18 The definition of types used in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) is largely based on earlier work by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995).
19 In keeping with the literature (see Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) we denote this type altruistic, although efficiency-loving would probably be a more
appropriate term. Note that efficiency-loving has been identified to be an important factor in shaping subjects’ behavior in non-strategic allocation tasks
(Charness and Rabin, 2002).
20 Even if a naïve type might reflect strategic decision making with diffuse beliefs, we follow Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) who describe naive types as
non-strategic.
Table 6
Estimated types of individuals and teams – own choices, first- and second-order beliefs.
Type Individuals Teams
Choices First-order beliefs Second-order beliefs Choices First-order beliefs Second-order beliefs
Altruistic 0.122 (0.051)nn 0.086 (0.042)nn 0.109 (0.050)nn 0.123 (0.070)n 0.073 (0.040)n 0.107 (0.046)nn
Pessimistic 0.070 (0.047) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Optimistic 0.407 (0.082)nnn 0.666 (0.074)nnn 0.848 (0.053)nnn 0.251 (0.067)nnn 0.573 (0.078)nnn 0.648 (0.076)nnn
Equilibrium 0.021 (0.021) 0.021 (0.021) 0.021 (0.021) 0.019 (0.028) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Sophisticated 0.058 (0.051) 0.102 (0.065) 0.000 (0.000) 0.020 (0.021) 0.000 (0.000) 0.042 (0.040)
D1 0.223 (0.080)nnn 0.122 (0.071)n 0.000 (0.000) 0.473 (0.087)nnn 0.281 (0.073)nnn 0.203 (0.068)nnn
D2 0.062 (0.042) 0.000 (0.001) 0.022 (0.028) 0.006 (0.047) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
L2 0.038 (0.049) 0.002 (0.011) 0.000 (0.001) 0.108 (0.060)n 0.073 (0.043)n 0.000 (0.002)
Sum Strategic 0.402 (0.076)nnn 0.248 (0.068)nnn 0.043 (0.035) 0.626 (0.082)nnn 0.353 (0.074)nnn 0.245 (0.068)nnn
Log likelihood 507.03 393.08 371.7 481.8 410.2 421.1
n Standard errors in parenthesis, significant at 10% level.
nn Standard errors in parenthesis, significant at 5% level.
nnn Standard errors in parenthesis, significant at 1% level.
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distribution of strategies in the experiment's subject pool as the estimated probability distribution.21
Given that, as noted by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), it is impossible to distinguish an optimistic type from a naïve type in
the 18 games used here. In the following estimation we therefore consider eight types so that optimistic and naïve are
collapsed in a single type, named optimistic.
For the estimation of the mixture model let i¼1,…, N index the different players (individuals or teams), let k¼1,…, K
index our types, and let c¼2, 3, or 4 be the number of a player's possible decisions in a given game. We assume that a type-k
player normally makes a type k decision, but in each game he makes an error with probability εk∈[0,1], type k's error rate, in
which case he makes each of his c decisions with probability 1/c. For a type-k player, the probability of a type k decision is
then 1-εk (c-1)/c. Hence, the probability of any single non-type-k decision is εk/c. We assume errors are independently and
identically distributed across games and players.
The likelihood function can be constructed as follows. Let Tc denote the total number of games in which a player has c
choices; in our design we have T2¼11, T3¼6, and T4¼1. Then let xick denote the number of player i's decisions that equal type
k's in games in which he has c choices with xik ¼ ðxi2k ; xi3k ; xi4k Þ, xi ¼ ðxi1;…; xiK Þ, and x¼ ðxi;…; xNÞ. Let pk denote players’
common prior k-type probability, and ∑Kk ¼ 1pk ¼ 1 and p¼(p1,…,pK). Let εk denote the k-type error rate and ε¼(ε1,…,εK).
Given that a game has one type-k decision and c-1 non-type-k decisions, the probability of observing a particular sample
with xik type-k decisions when player i is type k can be written as
LikðεkjxikÞ ¼∏c ¼ 2;3;4 1
ðc1Þ
c
εk
 xick εk
c
h iTcxick ð1Þ
Weighting the right-hand side by pk, summing over k, taking logarithms, and summing over i yields the log-likelihood
function for the entire sample:
ln Lðp; εjxÞ ¼∑ni ¼ 1ln∑Kk ¼ 1pkLikðεkjxikÞ ð2Þ
We provide two separate estimations of Eq. (2), one with individuals as decision makers and one with teams. In the
analysis of the results we interpret the estimated probability pk as the probability to find a player of type k in the population
under observation.
Table 6 presents the main estimation results. Under the heading “individuals” (”teams”) we show the estimated
probabilities for choices, first- and second-order beliefs of individuals (teams).22
Concerning actual choices, we can see from the bottom row of Table 6 that individuals are estimated as strategic types in
only 40% of cases, while 62% of teams are classified under any of the strategic types, and the difference is significant.23 There
are three types with a significantly positive probability, both for individuals and teams, and a fourth type which is only
significant for teams. The three significant types common to both types of decision makers are the non-strategic types21 The best responses in each game for each type are indicated in Fig. F4 in Supplementary material.
22 We have also run estimations with five types only where types (4)–(6) introduced above have been omitted (like in the initial approach of Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001). The results with respect to the estimated frequencies of strategic, respectively non-strategic, play remain practically the same as those
reported in Table 6.
23 At first sight it might seem surprising why the equilibrium type is so rare, while Table 1 has shown about 50% of equilibrium play by teams across all
games. For the classification of types it is important what a decision maker chooses when, for example, D1 and equilibrium do not suggest the same choice
(as is the case in 6 of our games). In these games, the large majority of teams opt for the D1-strategy rather than the equilibrium-choice, which explains why
the equilibrium types are rare.
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altruistic type does not differ significantly between individuals and teams, there are clear differences concerning the other
two types. Individuals are significantly more often than teams of the non-strategic optimistic type, while teams are
significantly more likely to be of the strategic D1-type. The fourth (weakly) significant type – which applies only to teams –
is the strategic type L2.
Looking at first- and second-order beliefs in Table 6, we note that teams are much more often classified as a strategic
type. This result shows that teams are more likely to expect their opponents to be strategic, and expect their opponents to
have strategic expectations as well.
Result 5: The likelihood of teams to be of any of the five different strategic types (equilibrium, sophisticated, D1, D2, L2) is
about 62%, while it is only 40% for individuals. Most of the individual decision makers are classified as optimistic types. First-
and second-order beliefs are also more often classified as strategic for teams than for individuals.
3.6. Econometric estimation II: choices and higher order beliefs
In this final results section we provide a joint estimation of choices and beliefs in order to explore if the behavioral
differences between teams and individuals are driven by differences in rationality or beliefs. For this purpose, we estimate a
model of “noisy introspection” as introduced by Goeree and Holt (2004).
In this model a player's choice probabilities are given by a logit best response that is a function of the player's first order
beliefs. Moreover the first-order beliefs are given by a logit best response that is a function of the player's second order
beliefs. More generally speaking, the beliefs of order z are given by a logit best response that is a function of the player's
beliefs of order z+1.
Let Sg denote the set of strategies in game g, then by Bgzi ¼ fb
g
zisgs∈Sg we denote (i) for z¼ 0 the probability distribution
associated to player i's choices in game g, (ii) for z≥1 the probability distribution associated to player i's beliefs of order z in
game g. We assume that the probability distribution Bgzi is a function of B
g
zþ1i, i.e., B
g
zi ¼ ϕzðB
g
zþ1iÞ ∀ z≥0 where the probability
to play action s in game g is given by bgzis ¼ ðexpðλzπeisðBgzþ1iÞÞ=∑s∈SgexpðλzπeisðB
g
zþ1iÞÞÞ for all z≥0, λz is the associated precision
parameter24 and πeisðBgzþ1iÞ denotes the expected payoff to player i from playing strategy s, as a function of B
g
zi. Then every
probability distribution Bgzi is the result of an infinite composition of logit best responses: B
g
zi ¼ ϕz∘ϕzþ1∘ϕzþ2∘⋯∘ϕ1. As in
Goeree and Holt (2004), we assume that λzþ1 ¼ ðλz=tÞ, t≥1, implying that higher order beliefs are characterized by
more noise.
Then let xig denote the choice of player i in game g, xi ¼ fxiggg∈G is the set of choices of player i in the set G of games, and
x¼ fxigi∈N is the set of choices observed in a set N of players. Then the log-likelihood of the entire sample is given by
Lðλ0; tjxÞ ¼ ∑
g∈G
∑
i∈N
lnbg0is; s¼ xig
Moreover (as in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008) we can estimate a similar model using the stated beliefs. In the
model described above we simply replace choices by stated (point) beliefs. Differently, we have that Bg0i ¼ fb
g
0isgs∈Sg denotes
the probability distribution associated to player i's stated beliefs in game g. Again we assume a precision parameter λz;b that
evolves according the rule λzþ1;b ¼ ðλz;b=tÞ, t≥1.
Let yig denote the stated first order beliefs of player i in game g, yi ¼ fyiggg∈G is the set of stated beliefs of player i in the set G of
games, and y¼ fyigi∈N is the set of stated beliefs observed in a set N of players. The log-likelihood of the entire sample is given by
Lðλ0;b; tbjyÞ ¼ ∑
g∈G
∑
i∈N
lnbg0is; s¼ yig
In Table 7 we present the results of the estimations for three subsets of games: (i) all games with a dominant strategy
(where players are able to solve the game by one or two rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies), (ii) games
without a dominant strategy in which players need two or three rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and
(iii) games without a dominant strategy that not dominance-solvable. For the estimations, we truncated the sequence
of beliefs at the 9th order, hence fixing Bg9i as uniformly distributed. For each subset of games, we report the values of
parameters λz and λz;b with their standard errors computed using the delta method.
When discussing the results, note that a value of λ0 (λ0,b) equal to zero means that strategies (stated beliefs) are chosen at
random. Similarly a value of λz (λz,b) equal to zero for z≥1 means that beliefs of order z are uniformly distributed. While all
estimates λ0 (λ0,b) are significantly different from zero in all subsets of games, a first noticeable difference between
individuals and teams arises from higher orders of beliefs λz (λz,b), z≥1. Indeed, for teams we find higher orders of beliefs that
are significantly different from the uniform distribution: in the first subset of games (the D-games), teams (individuals) have24 Our precision parameter λz corresponds to the inverse of the error rate μz in Goeree and Holt (2004). Note that as λz goes to infinity, the decision with
the highest expected payoff is selected with probability one, while as λz approaches zero , the decisions are taken according to a uniform probability
distribution.
Table 7
Noisy introspection model. Estimations using choices and stated beliefs.
Using choices Using stated beliefs
Individuals Teams Individuals Teams
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err
Games D 1R 2R
λ0 0.0671 0.0063 nnn 0.0778 0.0063 nnn λ0,b 0.1383 0.0090 nnn 0.1217 0.0073 nnn
λ1
+++ 0.0165 0.0040 nnn 0.0445 0.0049 nnn λ1,b 0.0403 0.0032 nnn 0.0435 0.0027 nnn
λ2
+++ 0.0041 0.0019 nn 0.0255 0.0063 nnn λ2,b 0.0118 0.0023 nnn 0.0155 0.0022 nnn
λ3
++ 0.0010 0.0007 0.0146 0.0057 nn λ3,b 0.0034 0.0011 nnn 0.0055 0.0013 nnn
λ4
+ 0.0002 0.0002 0.0084 0.0045 n λ4,b 0.0010 0.0004 nn 0.0020 0.0006 nnn
λ 5 0.0001 0.0001 0.0048 0.0033 λ5,b 0.0003 0.0002 n 0.0007 0.0003 nn
λ 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0023 λ 6,b 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 nn
λ 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0015 λ 7,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 n
λ 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0010 λ 8,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log Lik. 328.296 307.617 252.810 269.388
Games ND 2R 3R
λ0
++ 0.0531 0.0098 nnn 0.0843 0.0111 nnn λ0,b 0.1566 0.0353 nnn 0.1236 0.0123 nnn
λ1
+ 0.0064 0.0098 0.0288 0.0072 nnn λ1,b+ 0.0328 0.0080 nnn 0.0485 0.0050 nnn
λ2
+ 0.0008 0.0023 0.0099 0.0049 nn λ2,b+ 0.0069 0.0048 0.0191 0.0048 nnn
λ3 0.0001 0.0004 0.0034 0.0026 λ3,b+ 0.0014 0.0016 0.0075 0.0031 nn
λ4 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012 0.0012 λ4,b 0.0003 0.0005 0.0029 0.0017 n
λ 5 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 λ 5,b 0.0001 0.0001 0.0012 0.0009
λ 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 λ 6,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004
λ 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 λ 7,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
λ 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 λ 8,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
Log Lik. 156.040 139.142 125.974 120.173
Games ND 1R
λ0 0.1575 0.0183 nnn 0.1761 0.0193 nnn λ0,b 0.2066 0.0422 nnn 0.2405 0.0316 nnn
λ1 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ1,b 0.0497 0.0097 nnn 0.0627 0.0085 nnn
λ2 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ2,b 0.0120 0.0069 n 0.0163 0.0062 nnn
λ3 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ3,b 0.0029 0.0028 0.0043 0.0027
λ4 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ4,b 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010
λ 5 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ5,b 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
λ 6 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ 6,b 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
λ 7 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ 7,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
λ 8 0.0000 . 0.0000 . λ 8,b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log Lik. 127.422 118.647 105.464 67.527
n The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
nn The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
nnn The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
+++ The estimated parameter is significantly different between teams and individuals at the 1%, level.
++ The estimated parameter is significantly different between teams and individuals at the 5% level.
+ The estimated parameter is significantly different between teams and individuals at the 10% level.
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different from zero up to level three, while for individuals it's only up to level one. Only in the third subset of games (ND1)
we do not find a significant difference between individuals and teams. When we estimate the noisy introspection model
based on stated beliefs – see right hand side of Table 7 – the same qualitative results prevail, such that teams have
significantly higher level of beliefs than individuals in the first two subsets of games.
Finally, we can see some differences between individuals and teams by looking at the values of the estimated parameters.
Note that differences in λ0 (λ0,b) catch the difference in the ability to choose the strategy (to state the belief) with the higher
expected payoff. Differences in λz (λz,b), with z≥1, catch the differences in the beliefs about the rationality of the opponent,
the beliefs about the beliefs about the rationality of the opponents, and so on. We find that λ0 is significantly larger for teams
than for individuals in the second group of games, which is characterized by an intermediate degree of complexity.
The parameter λ0,b is never significantly different between teams and individuals. Looking at the beliefs we find that λ1, λ2,
λ3, λ4 are significantly larger for teams in the first subset of games and λ1, λ2 are significantly larger for teams in the second
subset of games. These findings show that teams are more likely to state beliefs with higher expected payoffs. This general
result is also confirmed when using the stated beliefs for estimations, where we find significant differences in the estimates
of λ1b, λ2b, λ3b in the second subset of games.
Result 6: Teams are characterized by higher order beliefs than individuals, by beliefs that more often are best responses to
beliefs that are of one level higher order and by a higher likelihood of choosing strategies that are maximizing expected
payoffs. Hence, teams differ from individuals both in rationality and in belief formation.
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In this paper we have studied the strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. We have found that teams are more
likely than individuals to play strategically, and to expect their opponents to be strategic and to have strategic expectations.
This implies that teams consider more often the structure of the game and the incentives of their opponents when making
decisions. Concerning actual choices, we have estimated the likelihood of strategic play for teams to be 62%, while it is only
40% for individuals. The modal type of team decision making is a strategic D1-type which applies one step of deleting
strategies that are dominated by pure strategies and then plays best reply to a uniform prior over the opponent's remaining
strategies. On the contrary, the modal type of individual decision making is a non-strategic optimistic type which picks the
strategy that maximizes the maximum possible payoff, assuming that the opponent plays randomly. Combining choices and
beliefs in a noisy introspection model, we have found that teams have higher higher-order beliefs than individuals, are more
likely to best reply in their beliefs to a one-level higher order, and are more likely to choose strategies that have higher
expected payoffs. This means that teams differ from individuals both in rationality and in beliefs. In fact, teams also expect
their opponents to be more sophisticated by having higher higher-order beliefs and strategies that have higher expected
payoffs.
A detailed analysis of individual and team behavior has shown that teams play the Nash equilibrium significantly more
often than individuals, and also expect their opponents to do so more often. Matching choices and first-order beliefs we
have found that teams are more likely to play a best reply with their choices to their own first-order point beliefs. While this
kind of consistency of choices and point beliefs is only found in 56% of individual decisions, it prevails in 66% of team
decisions. It seems noteworthy that the relative frequency of consistency of individual decisions is very similar to the one
reported by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008).
Our paper also adds to the literature on strategic sophistication through our analysis of the determinants of textbook
rationality. It is noteworthy that playing Nash and expecting the opponent to play Nash is more frequently observed with
teams. Moreover, and applying to both individuals and teams, this frequency also depends on the potential monetary losses
if a player deviates from Nash and on the distribution of payoffs in the Nash equilibrium, indicating that inequality aversion
plays a role for textbook rationality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
Our paper also contributes to the literature on team decision making in the following ways. It offers a classification of
teams according to eight different strategic and non-strategic types of decision making. The existing literature on team
decision making has mainly focused on whether or not teams play equilibrium strategies more often than individuals, and
our experiment can also answer this question affirmatively. Yet, we can add two novel pieces of evidence by showing the
differences between individuals and teams with respect to the distribution of different types of strategic and non-strategic
behavior and by examining how choices and point beliefs are related.
First, the main difference with respect to strategic types originates from teams being more likely a D1-type, as explained
above. This is an important difference to individual decision making as it shows that the higher strategic sophistication of
teams is particularly driven by teams thinking one step further than individuals, which is very important in strategic
contexts such as market entry, technology races or company takeovers. Future research should definitely explore in even
greater detail what makes teams more sophisticated. We conjecture that the dynamics of discussion within teams is be
important for final decisions made by teams. It might well be that strategically thinking group members might gain a more
than proportional influence in shaping team decisions. Alternatively, discussion within teams may let team members see the
decision problem in a different perspective, and thus creating strategically sophisticated team decisions. Since we have
deliberately opted for not videotaping team discussions – in order to keep conditions to the individual treatment as
comparable as possible – we are not able to answer these questions in this paper.
Second, we do not only elicit actual choices, but also first- and second-order point beliefs. This has not been done in the
team decision making literature before. Our approach allows checking the consistency of choices and first-order point
beliefs, respectively the expected consistency of one's opponent (by relating first- and second-order point beliefs). We have
found that teams are more consistent than individuals in this respect, and that they also expect their opponents to be more
consistent than individuals expect their opponents to be. The latter feature of team behavior reinforces the consistency of
teams, as it makes it more profitable for teams to be consistent themselves, because not playing Nash against an opponent
who picks the equilibrium strategy leads to smaller payoffs than choosing the equilibrium strategy. In fact, we find that
teams earn significantly more money than individuals in all games where one player has a dominant strategy (i.e., the
D-games). Our estimation of a noisy introspection model (Goeree and Holt, 2004) has shown that teams have higher higher-
order beliefs than individuals and also are more likely to choose strategies that have higher expected payoffs. Hence, teams
differ from individuals both in rationality and belief formation. One avenue for future research would be to explore whether
these important differences between individuals and teams would be mediated by feedback. In our experiment, we have not
given feedback in order to study strategic sophistication in the absence of learning. However, in many important real-world
situations, decision makers can learn from previous experience. Since individuals and teams have been shown in different
games to differ in their responsiveness to learning (Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Feri et al., 2010), it remains an open question
how feedback would affect the strategic sophistication of individuals and teams.
Summing up, our paper has provided compelling evidence that teams are more sophisticated, i.e., more strategic in
playing normal-form games than individuals. Given the surprisingly low level of strategic sophistication of individuals
reported in previous papers – and replicated in this one – we consider the finding that team decision making increases the
M. Sutter et al. / European Economic Review 64 (2013) 395–410410relative frequency of equilibrium play and the level of consistency in best responding to own point beliefs an important
contribution to the literature on strategic sophistication. Additionally, our paper is the first in the team decision making
literature that provides a fine-grained classification of teams into eight different strategic and non-strategic types of decision
makers and that examines higher order point beliefs, thereby adding important details to the bottom-line emerging from
the team decision making literature that “teams are more rational” than individuals.Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Loukas Balafoutas, Jordi Brandts, Gary Charness, David Cooper, Vince Crawford, Martin
Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter, Uri Gneezy, Nagore Iriberri, Martin Kocher, Dorothea Kübler, John List, Nikos Nikiforakis,
Pedro Rey-Biel, Georg Weizsäcker, an associate editor and two referees, and audiences at the University of California at San
Diego, the University of Paderborn, the AEA-Meeting in Atlanta, the ESA-European Meeting in Innsbruck, the EWEBE4-
Meeting in Barcelona, and the Spring Meeting of Young Economists in Lille for helpful comments. Financial support from the
Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through project P22772-G11 is gratefully
acknowledged.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
euroecorev.2013.06.003.References
Bhatt, M., Camerer, C.F., 2005. Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 52,
424–459.
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A., Normann, H.-T., 2010. Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem? Experimental Economics 13,
412–438.
Bolton, G.E., Ockenfels, A., 2000. ERC – a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193.
Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., Ziegelmeyer, A., 2004. Individual and groups decisions in the centipede game: are groups more rational players? Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 40, 599–605.
Bornstein, G., Yaniv, I., 1998. Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: are groups more “rational” players? Experimental Economics 1,
101–108.
Cason, T., Mui, V.-L., 1997. A laboratory study of group polarization in the team dictator game. Economic Journal 107, 1465–1483.
Charness, G., Dufwenberg, M., 2006. Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74, 1579–1601.
Charness, G., Jackson, M., 2007. Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. Journal of Economic Theory 136, 417–445.
Charness, G., Rabin, M., 2002. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817–869.
Cooper, D.J., Kagel, J.H., 2005. Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review 95, 477–509.
Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V., Broseta, B., 2001. Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: an experimental study. Econometrica 69, 1193–1235.
Costa-Gomes, M., Weizsäcker, G., 2008. Stated beliefs and play in normal-form games. The Review of Economic Studies 75, 729–762.
Crawford, V., Costa-Gomes, M., Iriberri, N., 2013. Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: theory, evidence, and applications. Journal of
Economic Literature 51, 5–62.
Crawford, V., Iriberri, N., 2007. Fatal attraction: salience, naiveté, and sophistication in experimental “Hide-and-Seek” games. American Economic Review
97, 1731–1750.
Danz, D., Fehr, D., Kübler, D., 2012. Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game. Experimental Economics 15, 622–640.
Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy, U., 2000. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30, 163–182.
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K., 1999. A Theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868.
Feri, F., Irlenbusch, B., Sutter, M., 2010. Efficiency gains from team-based coordination – large-scale experimental evidence. American Economic Review 100,
1892–1912.
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics 10, 171–178.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Gneezy, U., 2005. Step-level reasoning and bidding in auctions. Management Science 51, 1633–1642.
Goeree, J., Holt, C., 2004. A model of noisy introspection. Games and Economic Behavior 46, 365–382.
Greiner, B. 2004, An online recruiting system for economic experiments. In: Kremer, K., Macho, V. (Eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003.
GWDG Bericht 63, Goettingen, Gesellschaft fuer wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, pp. 79–93.
Haruvy, E., Stahl, D., Wilson, P., 1999. Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games. Economic Letters 63, 255–259.
Kocher, M., Sutter, M., 2005. The decision maker matters: Individual versus group behaviour in experimental beauty contest games. The Economic Journal
115, 200–223.
Kübler, D., Weizsäcker, G., 2004. Limited depths of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory. Review of Economic Studies 71, 425–441.
Rey-Biel, P., 2009. Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior 65, 572–585.
Stahl, D., Wilson, P., 1994. Experimental evidence of players' models of other players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organziation 25, 309–327.
Stahl, D., Wilson, P., 1995. On players’ models of other players: theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 213–254.
Weizsäcker, G., 2003. Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games. Games and Economic Behavior 44, 145–171.
